Professor Titular da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Connecticut (George J. and Helen M. England Professor of Law). É Doutor (PhD) e Mestre (MA) em Filosofia pela Universidade de Harvard, Doutor em Direito (JD) pela Universidade de Yale e bacharel em Economia e Filosofia (BA) pela Universidade de Harvard.
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A federal court should approach the presence of foreigners in a global class-action for monetary relief with an open mind. It should keep them in so long as it can conclude, upon a reflective comparative law analysis, that the judiciary in their nation of origin would uphold the ultimate ruling. For example, Iberian American absent class-members should normally stay on board inasmuch as virtually every jurisdiction in their region would allow a U.S. adjudicator to arrive at this conclusion. Accordingly, they would fail, on grounds of res judicata, if they ever tried to re-litigate the matter back home upon a defeat on the merits in the United States. In particular, a tribunal from any one of seven representative regional countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil) would most probably find such a U.S. judgment consistent with local due process, as well as with the remaining requirements for recognition. In other words, it would hold that absentees stemming from its jurisdictional territory could not legitimately complain about the preclusive effect since they would have free ridden on the efforts of their representatives with a chance at compensation, would have benefited from numerous fairness controls, and could have similarly faced preclusion in their homeland based on a suit prosecuted by someone else without their authorization. Judges in the United States should engage in a similar in-depth deliberation to decide whether to welcome citizens from anywhere else in the world to the litigation.
Um tribunal federal deve abordar a presença de estrangeiros em uma ação coletiva global de reparação pecuniária com mente aberta. Deve mantê-los na demanda sempre que puder concluir, a partir de uma análise reflexiva de direito comparado, que o Poder Judiciário de seu país de origem reconheceria a decisão final. Por exemplo, os membros ausentes de classes ibero-americanas devem, em regra, permanecer incluídos, uma vez que praticamente todas as jurisdições da região permitiriam que um julgador norte-americano chegasse a essa conclusão. Assim, eles não poderiam intentar nova ação em seus países de origem, em virtude da coisa julgada, caso viessem a ser derrotados quanto ao mérito nos Estados Unidos. Em especial, é altamente provável que um tribunal de qualquer um dos sete países representativos da região (México, Venezuela, Colômbia, Panamá, Peru, Equador e Brasil) considerasse tal decisão norte-americana compatível com o devido processo legal local, bem como com os demais requisitos de reconhecimento. Em outras palavras, entenderia que os ausentes oriundos de seu território jurisdicional não poderiam legitimamente contestar os efeitos preclusivos da decisão, pois teriam se beneficiado dos esforços de seus representantes com a possibilidade de indenização, teriam usufruído de diversos mecanismos de controle de equidade e poderiam igualmente enfrentar a preclusão em seu próprio país com base em uma ação movida por terceiros sem sua autorização. Juízes nos Estados Unidos devem realizar deliberação igualmente profunda para decidir se devem admitir cidadãos de outras partes do mundo em tais litígios.
Un tribunal federal debe abordar la participación de extranjeros en una acción colectiva global de reparación monetaria con una actitud abierta. Debe mantenerlos en el proceso siempre que pueda concluir, a partir de un análisis reflexivo de derecho comparado, que el poder judicial de su país de origen reconocería la sentencia final. Por ejemplo, los miembros ausentes de clases iberoamericanas deberían, por lo general, permanecer incluidos, dado que prácticamente todas las jurisdicciones de la región permitirían que un juez estadounidense llegara a dicha conclusión. En consecuencia, no podrían volver a litigar el asunto en su país de origen, por efecto de la
The internationalization of business and the diversification of the population have profoundly impacted the law. Ever more often, the U.S. judiciary has had to adjudicate claims staked by foreigners, who may or may not reside in the United States, and has had to face the corresponding logistical and cultural challenges (Sosa v. Álvarez-Machaín, 2004). In class actions, it has additionally confronted the problem of not knowing whether its ultimate ruling would attain recognition in the event of re-litigation abroad in forums possessing a different system of collective adjudication (Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 2013; Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 2013; St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 2014). Under these circumstances, the temptation simply to dismiss foreign absent class-members from the suit looms large.
This Article will argue that, particularly when dealing with a global class, which encompasses a sizeable proportion of non-citizens, federal courts should actually engage in intense comparative reflection to determine whether their counterparts in other nations would or would not enforce their judgments. Concentrating on Iberian America, it will maintain that they should keep a passive claimant on board so long as his or her jurisdiction of origin could appreciate U.S. class-actions as fair and compatible with local fundamental legal principles. A similar approach suggests itself with respect to absentees from other parts of the world.
Consequently, the Article will itself assess whether tribunals in Iberian America would likely uphold a final decision in a damages class-suit lodged in the United States. In particular, it will ascertain whether they would do so if any of the absent Iberian American class-members instituted an essentially identical complaint back home upon an adverse definitive determination north of the border. The discussion will consider Iberian America generally but focus specifically on a representative sample of seven countries: Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Ecuador. It will determine the likelihood of judicial enforcement in the region as a whole and in these specific jurisdictions.
Part I will identify the filing of an identical libel back home by absent class-members from Iberian America upon a disappointment here as the most likely—though still rather improbable—scenario for an actual confrontation of the question before me. It will attribute the relative likelihood to the practical implausibility of all other options; the improbability, to conceivable civilian impediments to the reprise, in consortium with the high chance of dismissal for either lack of jurisdiction or expiration of the statute of limitations. Despite these attributions, one can predict a courthouse rejection of the reiteration.
The next such segment (II) will list the main conditions for recognition:
Reciprocity from the State of Origin
The Foreign Court’s Jurisdiction over the Matter
Sufficiency of Service Alongside Defensive Opportunities
The Judgment’s Finality
Absence of Any Pending Similar Domestic Suit
Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction
Compatibility with Public Policy.
It will underscore the presumption in favor of enforcement. The relevant legislations incorporate some or all of these items. Of course, they differ in their details.
The subsequent subdivision (III) will demonstrate the fulfillment of the first six requirements. It will size these up in succession for each of the seven countries in the sample (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil). The ensuant partial sections (IV(A-F)) will corroborate the satisfaction of the seventh too. They will define (1) “public policy.” Under this definition, it will foremost include (2) due process. The judgment would mesh with both. It would rest on fairness controls for all class actions, besides those under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
A hypothetical Iberian American trier would agree with the Supreme Court north of the border on the opt-out regime’s full comportment with the second concept.
With this intensification, she could sign off from anywhere else in the region. Her approval would rest on a comprehensive application of the criteria to the remnant jurisdictions. It might build on the upcoming one for the analytic subset.
Passive partakers in the litigation could not in earnest complain about an unconscionable bind on them. They would have free ridden on the efforts of their representative, with perhaps their sole chance at compensation. Each one of them would have benefited from the aforementioned safeguards. Moreover, she could have similarly experienced preclusion in her homeland upon a prosecution—unbeknownst to her, without her authorization—at the behest of someone else.
On the whole, the U.S. judiciary should waive Iberian Americans through. It should treat other “aliens” on a par after an analogous analysis. The achievement of “justice for all” requires a serious stab at their inclusion.
This speculation will imagine a determination from Iberian America about the recognizability of a decision in this controversy. It will visualize an absent class-member’s interposition of a complaint there upon a reverse here. The terminal paragraphs will admit the unlikelihood of this concrete scenario. Despite this admission, they will rearticulate the near certainty of recognition.
Complainants may sue for monetary compensation under Rule 23(b)(3). Beyond predominance of commonality “over” disparateness, they must prove a cumulative “method[]” superior “to” others.
The judiciary may contemplate the presence of foreigners,
Contrariwise, its “more likely than not” recognition in their homeland could seal the “superiority” proof.
The federal judiciary tends to view the presence of foreigners, along with the corresponding res judicata complications, as relevant to the superiority inquiry,
After a ruling favorable to them, plaintiffs should not pursue execution abroad. They would demand domestic enforcement. The original judge could outdo his prospective subsequent counterparts overseas on this front through a cluster of pluses: from ease of access to defendant’s assets, through precise remedial tools, to broad contempt-prerogatives.
Upon an unfavorable adjudication, the claimants should not hazard another bite at the apple in Iberian America.
She might lodge a complaint despite these disincentives. After such a lodgment, a motion to dismiss should terminate her venture. Beyond the grounds above, it could repose on res judicata. Of course, the defendant would not have to cash in overseas on their exoneration. On the contrary, it could sit on the latter for ready interposition against any reignition endeavor by its adversaries.
The aforementioned obstacles might explain the paucity of caselaw on point. In the voice of
Iberian American tribunals could only refuse recognition in an arbitrary fashion. In consonance with the last precedent’s prediction, they would “more likely than not recognize” the outcome.
In any event, the parties may settle with the Court’s approval.
The various Iberian American countries set comparable parameters for the recognition in their territory of a judicial decision from abroad. They thus evince influences in plenty: from the regional debate on the topic;
The relevant regimes apply upon the inexistence of a special treaty, like with the United States in each instance. Via a polar presumption, they compel enforcement except upon failure in the satisfaction of any of these conditions:
Reciprocity from the State of Origin,
The Foreign Court’s Jurisdiction over the Matter,
Sufficiency of Service Alongside Defensive Opportunities,
The Judgment’s Finality,
Nonexistence of a Pending Similar Domestic Suit,
Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction,
Compatibility with Public Policy.
These criteria may contextually vary in their specific formulation. Despite this variance, they converge in essence for present purposes. For clarity, the discussion will stick to the numbering above. It will not adhere to that of the different legal systems.
The applicable scheme may require certain solemnities. For instance, it may demand authentication atop translation of the original decision. This analysis will not attend to such requirements. Under the assumption of their fulfillment, it will zero in on the aforementioned substantive ones.
First, Chapter VI of the Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure regulates the “Execution of Judgments.”
Article 571 imposes “conditions” on “execution.” It embraces every single one of those from the inventory above:
“[T]he tribunal may deny execution upon proof that in the country of origin, foreign judgments . . . are not executed in analogous cases.”
[...]
“The judge . . . rendering the judgment must have had jurisdiction to consider and decide the matter under recognized international law rules . . . compatible with those [of] this Code.”
[...]
“The defendant must have been personally notified and served [for an assurance of] his right to a hearing [atop] his defense.”
[...]
“[The judgment] must constitute res judicata in the country [of issuance,] with no further ordinary appeal available.”
[...]
“The original action may not involve a matter presently pending before a Mexican tribunal in a dispute between the same parties.”
[...]
“[The judgment] may not [stem] from an in rem action.”
[...]
“The obligation enforced by the original action may not run counter to public policy in Mexico.”
Typically, this provision focuses on the exclusive local jurisdiction over proprietorial suits.
Second, the 1998 Law of Private International Law controls this area in Venezuela.
(2) “The tribunals issuing the judgments must have jurisdiction over the cause of action. . . .”
(3) “The defendant must have been duly served, must have had sufficient time to appear, and must have benefited from procedural guaranties that would reasonably allow him to build a defense.”
(4) “The judgments must constitute res judicata according to the law of the state in which they were issued.”
(5) “No lawsuit on the same matter, between the same parties, and initiated prior to the issuance of the foreign judgment may be pending before Venezuelan tribunals.”
(6) “The judgments may neither impinge upon real property rights pertaining to real estate located in Venezuela nor effectively deprive Venezuela of any exclusive jurisdiction it may have over the matter at stake.”
(7) “Legal determinations based on . . . foreign law . . . shall produce effects in Venezuela, unless they contradict . . . the essential principles of the Venezuelan public policy.”
The first five items derive from Article 53. They evoke its several subparts, besides its heading “The Validity of Foreign Judgments.”
Third, Title XXXVI of Book Five of the Colombian Code of Civil Procedure deals with “Judgments . . . Issued Abroad.”
(1) “Judgments pronounced in a foreign country . . . shall have, absent a treaty, the same force as that granted there to those issued in Colombia.”
(3) “[T]he defendant must have been duly served and afforded the opportunity to contest the charges, in accordance with the law of the state of origin, all of which is presumed by virtue of the judgment’s finality.”
(4) “The judgment must be final under the law of the country of origin. . . .”
(5) “There may be neither a pending suit nor a final judgment in Colombia on the same matter.”
(6) “The judgment may not involve rights pertaining to real property located on Colombian territory. . . .”
(7) “The judgment may not run counter to Colombian laws related to public policy.”
Significantly, the provision takes a unique approach. It starts from the premise of a suitable summons.
Fourth, the 2014 Panamanian Code of Private International Law governs “The Process of Recognition [Alongside] Execution of Foreign Judgments.”
(1) “Upon the nonexistence of a special treaty with the state of origin, the judgment may be executed, [except] in case of proof that . . . no compliance with the decisions rendered by Panamanian tribunals takes place [there].”
(2) “The judgment must have been rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction. . . .”
(3) “The defendant [must have been] personally served with the complaint. [T]he proceedings abroad must have allowed him to contest the charges.”
(4) The “foreign judgment [must] constitute res judicata. It must be firm and final, [plus] no longer subject to appeal.”
(6) “The judgment may not encroach upon the Panamanian judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction, [such as that] over [local] real estate . . . .”
(7) “The judgment may not infringe upon fundamental principles or rights under public policy of Panama.”
Panamanian law may merely
Fifth, Peru’s 1984 Civil Code talks about the “Recognition of Foreign Judgments. . . .”
(1) “Reciprocity must be proven.”
(2) “The foreign tribunal must have had jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with the rules of private international law [besides] general principles on international procedural jurisdiction.”
(3) “The defendant must have been served according to the law of the forum, [before] a reasonable amount of time to appear [alongside] procedural guaranties to conduct his defense.”
(4) “The judgment must constitute res judicata under the law of the forum.”
(5) “There may be no trial pending in Peru between the same parties on the same matter, . . . initiated before the lodgment of the complaint from which the judgment ensued.”
(6) “The judgment may not involve matters within Peru’s exclusive jurisdiction.”
(7) It “may not run counter to public policy or good morals.”
Redolent of its Colombian counterpart, Article 2102 proclaims: “Upon the unavailability of a treaty with the country” of departure, “the judgment shall” enjoy the “effect” of those from a “Peruvian tribunal[]” there.
Sixth, Ecuador’s General Organic Code of Processes announces that “foreign judgments . . . shall be complied with” even “upon the lack of international treaties,” like “conventions.”
(3) “That . . . the defendant was legally notified and the parties’ defense . . . assured.”
(4) “That the judgment constitutes res judicata under the laws of the country” of rendition.
(7) That it does not, whenever “against a state,” “contravene constitutional provisions,” “the law,” “international treaties,” alongside plus conventions in force.”
The last item smacks of public policy. Still, it embodies a cardinal, separate proviso.
Seventh, Brazil’s 2015 Code of Civil Procedure features a series of “indispensable requirements.”
(2) “[must have been] pronounced by an authority with jurisdiction.”
(3) “[must have been] preceded by a regular summons, even if ultimately entered by default.”
(4) “[must] be effective in the country” of origin,
(5) “[may] not run counter to Brazilian rulings with a res judicata effect.”
(6) “[may not impinge upon the] exclusive jurisdiction of Brazil’s judicial authorities.”
(7) “[may] not offend public policy.”
Per Article 26(2), the recognition of a foreign judicial determination, in contrast to other instances of international legal cooperation, does not ride on the submission of a diplomatic confirmatory statement about the existence of reciprocity.
My comments will now measure a future decision against these prerequisites. They will color it apt for recognition. A judge should recognize it. She could only cast it off as unrecognizable through arbitrariness.
The analysis will turn to the first six standards (III). After these, it will transition to the denser seventh one (IV). In the journey through this density, I will rely on six divisions (A-F).
Arguendo, the plaintiffs are prosecuting the original complaint in the federal judicial district of the main facts alongside the defendants domicile. They are not zooming in on real property located in Iberian America. Jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship, under the law of a state that has adopted the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment Recognition Act.
First, Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Peru require reciprocity in the open. They should ordinarily concede its existence. So should the remaining nations, insofar as integrative of the requirement sub silentio.
Under the statute, a judge “shall recognize” decisions from abroad.
Second, she would enjoy the requisite jurisdictional power over the subject matter in: Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, Brazil. Beyond these, any other nation with such prerequisite by intimation should concede her this enjoyment. Per Mexico’s Federal Code of Civil Procedure, she “must have had jurisdiction to consider and decide the matter under [1] recognized international law rules . . . compatible with [2] those” of the codification.
Before Panama, Venezuela itself legislated separately on private international law. The Venezuelan 1998 Law of Private International Law would jurisdictionally empower her in the “territory” of the “facts,” “obligations,” or “contracts.”
In Peru, the 1984 Civil Code solely invokes international legal norms.
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, somewhat like its Mexican counterpart, exclaims: “An action based on a personal right . . . shall” unroll “in the forum of the defendant’s domicile.”
For the third parameter, the summons in harness with the trial will unfold under the Federal Rules. Consequently, it will afford the defendant suitable service besides occasion for a vigorous defense, in honor of an express mandate in all seven countries. For sure, none of these calls, with respect to anyone else, for: notification, summons, litigious opportunities. All the same, absent class-members will receive individual notice, with a chance of participation in the litigation.
Fourth, the ultimate decision will possess finality, “binding” everyone.
Fifth, this inquiry presupposes the dearth of any pending identical domestic suit, per the explicit demands (from Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru) atop any implicit ones. It zeroes in on the very first Iberian American complaints. These would precede any others.
Per the omnipresent sixth standard, the controversy does not touch upon real estate located in Iberian America. It should not impinge upon any other local jurisdictional prerogatives either.
In Iberian America, a tribunal may refuse a final judicial decision from abroad counter to public policy. Thereby, it should not undermine the presumption in favor of recognition. The exception in question applies upon a clear collision with the polity’s vital precepts.
Atop French scholar Henri Capitant, the Panama’s Supreme Court has defined the notion before us as one that: “encompasses norms” for the advancement of “the interests of individuals, guaranteeing societal coexistence.” This notional contributor “to social,” “collective welfare,” under the guidance of universal “precepts” (such as: “justice,” “morality”), merits enshrinement in the “Constitution.”
The concept should degenerate to neither the laws in force nor current official politics. It sets itself apart by its development over time, under the influence of numerous institutions, toward permanence.
Statutes besides policies may coincide with it. However, they often do not. Hence, one must check for further corroboration in other sources of diverse sorts: judicial, jurisprudential, organic, constitutional, international.
For example, a judge in an extradition proceeding may have to assess a foreign capital sentence for consistency with public policy.
From the Mexican Supreme Court’s vantage:
Public policy takes the law [alongside] the caselaw into account, ultimately constituting a norm [with] a nullifying effect under extreme circumstances. [Not resting] on a sum of purely private interests, [it] touches upon others of such importance, . . . forbidding acts [detrimental to] the collectivity, the state, or the nation, even [despite a suffering by] the concerned parties of no loss, [or an acquiescence by these].
A foreign judgment must clash with these crucial interests, perhaps fundamental principles. It should injure the entire society.
A decision in the case at bar would comply with U.S. law on substance atop procedure. Therefore, it would jell with cardinal norms in Iberian America. Absentees might raise due process concerns because of the preclusive aftereffect for them. They could protest the want of any consultation with them.
Due process with its strict ban on legally arbitrary deprivations (of: life, liberty, property) has become a central component of the constitution everywhere across Iberian America.
A tribunal in Iberian America, like the United States, would pass on the procedural setup’s fairness to absent class-members.
An Iberian American judge would consider comparable homegrown suits. She should determine the degree of their incorporation of Rule 23(b)(3) features apparently violative of due process. Section E will first discuss regional suits for an analogous vindication of many homogenous interrelated individual entitlements. It will analyze them through their bindingness on scores of people through an informal option-in or the neglect of an option-out. Accordingly, the analogous scheme from the United States should not come across as iniquitous.
Then, the same segment will analyze diffuse-rights suits, resemblant of Rule 23(b)(2) actions alongside citizen suits, existent in every one of the nations under consideration, atop all over the continent. It will expose them as wresting the individual right to sue from an absentee without any consent from her, notification to her, or a bail-out opportunity for her. The analysis will stress the irrelevance of the substantive entitlement’s collectiveness, versus individuality. It will close with an assessment of Rule 23(b)(3) actions, like ubiquitous diffuse-rights suits, consistent with due process besides public policy.
As a whole, the ensuant partitions will endorse the holding in
An Iberian American judge should realize the upshot of a refusal of recognition. In practice, she would deprive the defendant itself of due process, discriminating against it. In particular, it would have risked effective liability to absent class-members without a correspondent, complete exoneration in prospect upon a victory on the merits against them. They could not rightfully denounce the preclusive impact on them, upon their shot at compensation through the effort of others, with ample benefits en route: procedural protection, information, exit option. Moreover, the same sweeping res judicata effect could have struck them in their lands of origin.
On first impression, a judgment in the present controversy might encroach upon due process through its preclusion of absent class-members upon their failure to “opt out.” They might deplore the lack of conferment with them before preemption of their litigation.
Class actions exist precisely for the advantage of those represented. With meticulousness, the drafters of Rule 23, besides its judicial interpreters, have secured the entitlements of each absentee. Like their Iberian American counterparts, they have relied on due process. Therefore, a judge in Iberian America should deem the U.S. class action itself alongside the final decision compatible with the local conception of due process.
The Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment, responsible in essence for the current Rule 23,
[…] provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class[,] and refers to the measures which can be taken [for] the fair conduct of these actions.
The representatives appear themselves. They can shift for themselves. Therefore, issues of fairness arise for the most with respect to those under their purview. The Supreme Court has interpreted many of the “specifications of the Rule” as part of a design for the protection of the latter.
Rule 23 structures the whole procedure for class actions for the assurance of fair treatment. For instance, it requires the certification of the class ahead of the game. Representatives must show, inter alia, that their capacity for a fair, adequate protection of “the interests of the class.”
The Supreme Court has explained how these controls safeguard the absentees’ well-being:
A plaintiff class . . . cannot first be certified unless the judge, with the aid of the named plaintiffs and defendant, conducts an inquiry into the common nature of the named plaintiffs’ and the absent [members’] claims, the adequacy of representation, the jurisdiction possessed over the class, and any other matters that will bear upon proper representation of the [absentees’] interest.
These checks should guarantee the absentees’ profit from the litigation.
After this battery of preliminary tests, the tribunal must then “appoint class counsel.”
Moreover, the judge engages with extraordinary intensity. She must look after the welfare of class members.
In conducting [the] action . . . , the court may issue orders that . . . require—to protect [them,] fairly conduct[ing] the action—giving appropriate notice to [them] of (i) any step in the action; (ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or (iii) [their] opportunity to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise come into the action.
She may also “impose conditions on their representative[s],” such as the elimination of “allegations about representation of [those] absent [among them] and that the action proceed accordingly or . . . deal with similar procedural matters.”
In a parallel vein, Rule 23 compels the securement of her “approval” for important developments: conciliation, voluntary dismissal, compromise.
With these constraints, the law upholds their due process. It specifically manifests “concern . . . for” the absentees among them, atop a “continuing solicitude for their rights.”
An Iberian American colleague of hers could himself ascertain any infringement upon the entitlements of the passive participants among them. He would understand the inner mechanism as one in the interest of these. The strictures would suffice for purposes of Iberian American due process, atop that from the United States.
Ultimately, those absent among them, like their U.S. peers, could hardly cry “foul” before him ex post facto. After all, they would have free ridden on the plaintiffs’ efforts, with a chance at compensation upon a favorable ruling, with the benefit—throughout the proceedings—of actors (judge, attorney, representative) solicitous, by law, of their welfare around the affair at hand. He would regard the entire arrangement as a patently fair one. Through the collective litigation, they had staked their claim without any of the requisites: northward travel, familiarization with the legal system, hire of a lawyer, separate complaint.
“Rule 23(b)(3) added to the complex-litigation arsenal class actions for damages” toward “secure judgments binding [on] all class members save those” among them with an affirmative exclusion-election.
At her behest, they must receive [1] the best notice . . . practicable under the circumstances, including [2] individual notice to all” those among them identifiable “through reasonable effort.”
clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members. . . .
The Advisory Committee set forth this notification regime to ensure compliance with due process: “This mandatory notice . . . , together with any discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable to give . . . , is designed to fulfill requirements of due process . . . .”
An Iberian American tribunal would value these special measures to keep an absent member abreast of any significant developments and to permit her to exit. It would view them as purposely protective of absentees among them. The framers’ efforts would come across as more than sufficient in a region that essentially shares the due process concept with the United States.
For them: “The interests of [absentees] are sufficiently protected by the forum . . . with a request for exclusion . . . within a reasonable time . . . .”
If the forum . . . wishes to bind an absent [class-member] concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due[-]process protection. The [absentee] must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. . . . The notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it. Additionally, . . . due process requires at a minimum that an absent [class-member] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an “opt out” or “request for exclusion” form to the court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class[-]members.
They underscored the acquiescence through a declination of the allowable bail-out.
[T]he “opt out” procedure . . . is by no means
The “advantages in judicial efficiency” inure foremost to the benefit of absentees. Therefore, these can scarcely repudiate the judgment as inequitable to them.
An Iberian American judge would, on the heels of her U.S. colleagues, reason for these safeguards’ sufficiency. She should espouse the comportment of Rule 23(b)(3) class-actions, like that of the comparable local suits from the next Subsection, with (1) due process alongside (2) public policy. Once again, the former should not yield different answers on the two sides of the border.
Iberian American absent class-members, like their U.S. counterparts, could not with just cause subsequently remonstrate by her against their incorporation. She would rebuff any remonstrations from them. After all, they would have learned about the litigation details, with a fair chance to stay aboard or jump ship.
She could assess the influence of background conditions on their informational access besides their consent capacity. Her assessment would alert her to the transparent communicative channel at their disposal. They could hardly allege disconnection.
In extremis, they might invoke the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory. As pleaders, they could plead for additional protections through it.
It applies to “service of process” alongside “summonses.”
Miguel Ángel Narváez Carvajal’s apposite manual focuses in the main on the Inter-American system, Latin America, plus Ecuador. In its own words: Through this “international judicial cooperation,” “national judges” besides “tribunals” may “summon the defendant” via the “judicial organs of other states. . . .”
Might due process in itself, beyond international law, command a summons for absentees? Actually, (1) a summons under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 would inform them less comprehensively about the relevant aspects of the procedure than (2) the 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii) notification.
The former would, in essence, explicate to them the consequences of “failure to appear and defend.”
Of course, service to them would include the complaint like the summons.
A unanimous
The burdens placed by a State upon [them] are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant. An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum State to render judgment
In comparison:
Besides [the] continuing solicitude for their rights [under Rule 23], absent . . . class[-]members are not subject to other burdens imposed upon defendants. They need not hire counsel or appear, . . . are almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs, . . . are not subject to coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind [them] for any damages, although a valid adverse judgment may extinguish any of [their] claims which were litigated.
For reassurance, an Iberian American tribunal could point to (1) homegrown suits evocative of (2) class actions. They could not reject the latter except upon an improbable rejection of the latter.
Lately, the entire region has been warming to collective litigation in general, to a greater extent than Europe. At times, it might be exceeding Anglo America in this regard.
I will first examine a widespread suit with a resemblance to a Rule 23(b)(3) action. It binds absentees who have either opted in rather informally or not opted out at all. Then, I will consider a ubiquitous suit evocative of a Rule 23(b)(2) action, alongside a citizen suit. They preclude them despite the want of assent from or notice to them.
A judge from Iberian America could invoke either procedural device in her recognition of the judgement against them. She could reject their contention of unfairness.
Iberian America has been authorizing the agglomeration of singular, similar, interrelated entitlements, in the vein of Rule 23(b)(3), upon casual entrance, sometimes neglect of a simple exit. It has been naming them “homogenous individual.” Of the seven countries under consideration, five have ventured into this domain. Two (Mexico, Colombia) include a candidate through commission. In contrast, the remaining three (Panama, Peru, Brazil) incorporate her via omission.
The Mexican Federal Code of Civil Procedure provides for the safekeeping of “rights . . . pertaining to”
Colombian Law 472 of 1998 executes the constitutionalized mandate for a regulation of “group”
The filer stands in for others also aggrieved through “the injurious” conduct.
Under Panamanian Law 45 of 2007, the “members of a . . . class” may, upon a “prejudice . . . from a product or service,” prosecute a suit. They incorporate by default those likewise prejudiced.
The “plaintiff and all persons” within the grouping “may appear to vindicate their rights . . . .”
Anyone may “exclude himself.”
Moreover, Law 19 of 2008 creates a cause to actualize aggregate entitlements through international litigation. It predicates: After an encroachment, (1) “those impacted” or a representative outfit may carry the banner.
The provisions of the Peruvian codified consumer-enactment empower the “National Institute for the Defense of Competition and for the Protection of Intellectual Property”
In addition, the Constitutional Court has crafted a comparable contraption to enforce entitlements under the Constitution. In 2008, it explained that in the face of “
Obviously, the opining jurists were primarily thinking of a case in which the trying adjudicator determines that a “threat or violation” has occurred.
Several Brazilian parties—from the Procurator General, through the government, to governmental or nongovernmental organizations—may institute public civil actions to address “moral” like “pecuniary damage” to, inter alia, “the environment”; the consuming population; the “urban order”; “goods or rights with artistic, aesthetic, historic, touristic, or scenic value.”
The “judge” may head in these directions sua sponte.
On matters of consumption, the pertinent codification’s “Title III,” which subsidiarily “controls” the litigious effort,
The legislation describes “the res judicata” impact as “[
In light of these various suits, a tribunal from any of these nations or elsewhere in Iberian America will tend to regard Rule 23(b)(3) actions as compatible with public policy. It should view them as comparable enough to the local suits to justify ruling that they do not contravene any of the relevant systemic principles. The differences in the details should not affect the analysis.
Of course, Iberian American absent class-members seeking a second bite at the apple might press for the rejection of an adverse U.S. judgment unless the jurisdiction at the receiving end imposes a stand-in on persons who have not extricated themselves from the imposition. Despite helping Mexicans alongside Colombians, this position does not sound very persuasive. After all, it construes as decisive a contingency unrelated to public policy—to wit, how the constructively present partake in the ongoing controversy under the statutory parameters locally in force. Adopters of an opt-in arrangement, the countries of the just mentioned nationals could have institutionalized an opt-out regime instead without altering their legally or constitutional basic framework. Actually, Mexico’s Congress originally considered a proposal that would have necessitated a “member [to] request his exclusion.”
Once again, adjudicators may not resist recognition merely because the foreign statute applied differs from its domestic counterpart. They would have to ascertain, additionally, an unmistakable clash with long-standing, deep-rooted societal precepts. As in the death penalty example invoked in Section IV(D)(1), the judicial inquiry would have to turn up a conflicting cardinal norm in the fundamental laws, charter, ratified international treaties, et cetera. However, no such conflict exists with 23(b)(3) actions.
Consistently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected in
Defendants fail to identify an explicit conflict with public policy that would bar recognition of the judgment. The mere fact that [local] law does not explicitly embrace a foreign legal mechanism does not mean that it would find the judgment so repugnant that it would reject it as violating public policy.
Absentees from Iberian America could not rightfully decry the broad preclusive reverberation of a final decision as an iniquity. They could have hardly expected the U.S. class-action, about which they would have individually received detailed information, to unfold as a comparable homegrown suit, about which they would have realistically known little.
In particular, a resident citizen of practically any state in the region could not credibly protest that she did not read the notifying letter, assuming that she had to plump for the suit as under some of the regional regimens (Mexico, Colombia). Nor could she reasonably hope to escape preclusion through this protestation. Naturally, she could more convincingly object if her legal system of origin would never terminate, through an action that she did not unambiguously approve, her right to sue. Nevertheless, I will now show that virtually all Iberian American jurisdictions permit the termination under these circumstances.
So-called diffuse-rights actions, which resemble those under civilly procedural Rule 23(b)(2) or citizen suits in the United States, have developed dramatically, ubiquitously in Iberian America over the last three decades.
The almost universally exercisable unconstitutionality-complaint provides a special case in point.
Such devices bear critical relevance to the discussion. They actually operate more extremely than those under Rule 23(b)(3) inasmuch as they (1) encompass mostly a considerably larger constellation of non-consenting partakers, (2) afford those so grouped no personal notice at all, and (3) accord them no opportunity to opt out. In light of their pervasiveness across the Iberian American expanse, though, the bench there could hardly regard them as unfamiliar, let alone as contrary to public policy.
The implement under the microscope has seemingly lived through a lengthy history. It might have descended from civil-law popular suits. These date back at least to ancient Rome. They have sported from the start expansive preclusive resonance. The
During the nineteenth century, the framers of codes across the region regularly codified existent law, which evidently absorbed its Roman ancestor without mediation or through the Spanish statutory compilation
Since the 1990s, Iberian America has experienced an explosion in this form of enforcement. It has embraced not merely derivative alongside associational suits, in which shareholders or associates head to the courthouse on behalf of a corporation or an association, but additionally wide-ranging ones for the effectuation of diffusely defined guaranties. Constitutions and statutes promote these pursuits, including the unconstitutionality variant cited earlier. En route, they may expressly stress the preemptive impact with respect to all. Not surprisingly, every single one of the jurisdictions under consideration has participated in this subcontinental movement.
Mexico authorizes “collective” complaints “to safeguard diffuse . . . rights” besides “interests,” understood as those held by “an indeterminate . . . collectivity” of similarly situated people.
Significantly, an adjudication on the merits wrests the entitlement to insist on them, before an adjudicator, from all outstanding statutorily licensed candidates for vindicator. For the attainment of standing, the controverted affair indeed “may not have become a conclusively adjudicated one as a result of previous litigation.”
Correspondingly, the “Procurator General” alongside “33%” of one of the parliamentary organs may contradict the constitutionality of a state’s or the federation’s enactments “within” about a month of their “publication.”
On Venezuelan soil, anyone may “vindicate” her entitlements, among them “those” collectively or diffusely describable.
Besides: “The summons shall be published in a national or regional newspaper . . . .”
Moreover, “the Constitutional Chamber” of the top tribunal must hear popularized disputes of constitutionality.
Passed in 1998, Colombian Law 472 controls prosecutorial exertions in the name of the populace “for the protection of” any jointly enjoyed entitlement.
In addition, a civic actor may postulate the “unconstitutionality” of “laws.”
On Panamanian territory, Law 24 of 1995 welcomes one to exercise an “environmental” cause on “not an individual or direct” detriment but rather a menace to diffusely configured, communal “interests.”
Furthermore, the Plenum of the premier adjudicative body must “decide” on the constitutionality of “laws . . . challenged” by anybody.
As an upshot of the initial plaintiff’s effort, all his contenders lose their right to process the purported violator. The quoted sentences specify what sometimes remains implied: The conclusive collectivized resolution may subsequently block somebody who strictly speaking played the part of neither a joiner nor an intervenor at the outset.
In Peru, one “may file for a protective writ when a threat to or a violation of [ecological besides] other diffuse [entitlements] that boast constitutional stature is at stake. . . .”
To boot, the republic regulates (1) popular besides (2) unconstitutionality proceedings.
The relevant Ecuadorian enactment emphasizes that “natural” alongside “juridical persons,” besides a collection of people, may precautionarily, imprescriptibly sue for satisfaction on account of any environmentally exacted “damage.”
Pursuant to the construction of its foremost institutional interpreter, the 2008 instrument of governance in the same jurisdictional terrain envisages the vindication of “diffuse rights.”
In concordance with this clearance, unconstitutionality causes permit one to question the constitutionality of unapplied laws alongside regulations.
In Brazil, the 1988 charter establishes that the citizenry may pursue “a popular action” “to annul . . . acts harmful to” governmental “property” alongside governmentally undertaken conduct “that impinges upon”: “the administrative-integrity principle, the environment,” “historical” besides “cultural goods.”
Correlatively, the Public Ministry—alongside: chief executives or lawmaking leaderships of central besides immediate subcentral governments; “political parties,” “unions,” the “Bar Association”—may likewise “originally” assert the unconstitutionality of statutes before the forum of final instance.
Evocative of 23(b)(2) actions alongside citizen suits, all these procedures turn on a genuinely joint assertion. Despite their divergence from actions that agglomerate an assortment of similar individually interrelated pretentions, they obviously may matter enormously to those who may gain by them. Illustratively, someone may understandably care about the possibility of fighting against the pollution of a nearby mutualized lake as much as, or more than, the contamination of her backyard.
Importantly, the ruling in a diffuse-rights suit does deprive absent community members of an individual entitlement: namely, that to sue. It robs them, so to speak, of their day in court. Absentees individually lose the right to litigate on their substantive collective entitlements, like their substantive individual entitlements in a Rule 23(b)(3) action.
(1) A decision in a diffuse-rights suit differs from (2) one in a 23(b)(3) class action only in the minimal respect just discussed: The former entails a loss of an individual procedural entitlement connected to a collective substantive one, the latter that of an individual procedural entitlement with a connection to an individual substantive one. Iberian American judges could only arbitrarily find an infringement upon due process besides public policy in one instance but not in the other. Most likely, they would not do so.
Absentees from Iberian America could not really complain. They could not truthfully say that back home, they would never face preclusion through an action that they did not themselves advance or, at a minimum, consent to. After all, a diffuse-rights suit precludes the entire citizenry in precisely this manner. It does so ever more recurrently in virtue of its increased availability alongside its popularity.
The first section (A) defined the concept of public policy, atop that of due process. It summarized the ensuing discussion. The next three (B-D) maintained that a tribunal in Iberian America would very probably hold that class-action judgments in general besides those under Rule 23(c)(3)(B) in particular treat absent class-members fairly, in tune with the two notions.
Per subsequent segment’s subdivisions (E(1-3), the holding would find further support in the availability of homogenous-individual-rights suits, which recall 23(b)(3) actions, binding absentees who have either stepped in rather informally or simply failed to opt out. It would attain definitive confirmation in the fact that ubiquitous analogues to 23(b)(2) actions alongside citizen suits invariably wrest the right to sue from the represented collectivity’s non-assenting absent members.
At the outset, this ponderation noted that a refusal of recognition would discriminate against the defendant. It emphasized that absentees could not reject the decision’s res judicata impact as unjust to them. They would have taken a free ride on the litigation with their only realistic chance at compensation, would have benefited from a wide array of safeguards, such as those around notice besides exit, and could have faced preclusion under similar circumstances in their homeland.
The discussion started by imagining a concrete situation in which an Iberian American tribunal might confront the question whether to recognize the judgment. As the most likely (yet rather improbable) scenario, it posited one in which absent class-members launch an identical complaint in Iberian America after a defeat against them alongside their allies. In the end, they will probably not embark upon renewed litigation because of the overarching civilian obstacles in the way, besides the high chance of dismissal either for lack of jurisdiction or expiration of the statute of limitations. In any event, the subsequent adjudicator would dismiss the endeavor in deference to the prior decision.
Part II listed these as the main conditions for recognition in Latin America.
Reciprocity from the State of Origin
Foreign Court’s Jurisdiction over the Matter
Sufficiency of Service and Defensive Opportunities
Judgment’s Finality
Absence of Any Pending Similar Domestic Suit
Respect for Areas of Exclusive National Jurisdiction
Compatibility with Public Policy
It showed the incorporation of many of them, atop a presumption in favor of enforcement, within the relevant legislation from the nations under examination: Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil.
The ensuant judge would almost certainly agree with the U.S. Supreme Court on the comportment of the opt-out regime with due process. The version of this concept before her would have traveled from the United States throughout Iberian America. Despite this transcontinental travel, it would have preserved its essential components intact.
Furthermore, she could point to actions—in her own country or others inside her cultural region—for the aggregation, along the lines of Rule 23(b)(3), of similar interrelated personal claims of non-parties. These acquiesce likewise upon the failure to opt out or an informal entrance.
During her finale, she could accentuate the diffuse-right suit existent throughout the subcontinent. Resemblant of that under the previous provision (23(b)(2)), it binds innumerable absentees, without their consent or individual notice to them, through the extinction of an individual procedural entitlement besides a collective substantive one. Upon this trajectory, she could recognize the judgment from almost anywhere within the territory on the table.
The judiciary in the United States should, in principle, allow Latin American citizens into large representative suits for economic indemnification. Naturally, it should approach the presence of other foreigners just as openly, conducting a comparative law analysis analogous to that undertaken in this Article. After all, the pursuit of justice for all demands the inclusion, across the board, of the traditionally excluded.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
In discussing “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in [the] particular forum,” the
In discussing “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in [the] particular forum,” the
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
There has been an “intense cross-fertilization of procedural ideas in the region.” OQUENDO (2017),
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, O.A.S. T.S. No. 51, 1439 U.N.T.S. 91.
“Generally, the relevant Latin American countries, regardless of whether they are signatories, look to the principles embodied in the Bustamante Code and Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards . . . to determine whether to recognize a foreign judgment.” Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
CÓDIGO FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES [CD. FED. PRO. CIV.] (Mex.) (1943), Lib. IV, Título [Tít.] I, Capítulo [Cap.] VI, arts. 569-577 (“Ejecución de Sentencias”).
CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 569 (“Las sentencias . . . [extranjeras] tendrán eficacia y serán reconocidos en la República en todo lo que no sea contrario al orden público.”).
Ley de Derecho Internacional Privado [L. Der. Int’l Priv.], Gaceta Oficial 36.511 (Venez.) (1998).
DECRETO 1400 & 2019, CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] (Colom.) (1970), Lib. V, Tít. XXXVI, arts. 693-97 (“Sentencias . . . Proferid[a]s en el Exterior”).
LEY [L.] 7, CÓDIGO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO [CD. DER. INT’L PRIV.] (Pan.) (2014), Tít. VIII, Cap. III (“Proceso de Reconocimiento y Ejecución de Sentencia Extranjera”).
CD. CIV (Peru) (1984), Lib. X, Tít. IV (“Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias . . . extranjer[a]s.”).
Id.
CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] (Peru) (1993), art. 838 (“Se presume que existe reciprocidad respecto a la fuerza que se da en el extranjero a las sentencias . . . pronunciad[a]s en el Perú. Corresponde la prueba negativa a quien niegue la reciprocidad.”).
Id.
CÓDIGO ORGÁNICO GENERAL DE PROCESOS [CD. PRO. CIV.] (Ecuador) (2015), art. 104(4) (“A falta de tratados y convenios internacionales, se cumplirán [las sentencias extranjeras].”).
LEI [L.] 13105, CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [CD. PRO. CIV.] (Braz.) (2015), art. 963 (“requisitos indispensáveis”).
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (Unif. Law Comm’n 2005).
CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 571(III) (“Que el juez o tribunal sentenciador haya tenido competencia para conocer y juzgar el asunto de acuerdo con las reglas reconocidas en el derecho internacional que sean compatibles con las adoptadas por este Código.”).
CD. FED. PRO. CIV. (Mex.) (1943), art. 24(II) (“El [lugar] del domicilio del demandado, tratándose de acciones reales sobre muebles o de acciones personales, colectivas o del estado civil . . . .”).
“Personal rights,” according to the influential Chilean Civil Code, “are those that may only be vindicated against certain persons. . . . Personal actions originate in these rights.” CD. CIV (Chile) (1857), art. 578 (“Derechos personales . . . son los que sólo pueden reclamarse de ciertas personas. . . . De estos derechos nacen las acciones personales.”).
L. Der. Int. Priv. (Venez.) (1998), arts. 40 & 47.
CD. DER. INT. PRIV. (Pan.) (2014),
CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), Lib. X, Tít. IV (“Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias . . . extranjer[a]s.”).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
L. 13105, CD. PRO. CIV. (Braz.) (2015), art. 46 (“A ação fundada em direito pessoal . . . será proposta, em regra, no foro de domicílio do réu.”).
L. 13105, CD. PRO. CIV. (Braz.) (2015), art. 46 (“A ação fundada em direito pessoal ou em direito real sobre bens móveis será proposta, em regra, no foro de domicílio do réu.”).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B), 23(d)(1)(B)(iii), & 24.
Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).
[Grupo Capital Factoring v. Karikal Investment], Exp. No. 852-02, Sala 4ta Neg. Gen., Ct. Supr. Jus. (Pan.) (2008) (“[E]l orden público comprende las normas y principios que defiende los intereses de los particulares y que garantiza la convivencia en sociedad, busca la seguridad social y colectiva, donde se destacan los principios de justicia y moral que deben regir en todo Estado; además de concebirse como los principios fundamentales estipulados en nuestra constitución.”).
In Argentina, for example, extradition will not “lie whenever it would run counter to . . . public policy.” L. 24767 (Arg.) (1998), art. 10 (No “procederá la extradición cuando existan especiales razones de . . . orden público[.]”).
3ra Sala, 5ta Época, Seman. Jud. Fed., T. XXXVII, p. 1835, Supr. Ct. Just. Nac. (Mex.) (1933) (“El orden público que tiene en cuenta la ley y la jurisprudencia, para establecer una norma sobre las nulidades radicales, no puede estar constituido por una suma de intereses meramente privados; para que el orden público esté interesado, es preciso que los intereses de que se trate, sean de tal manera importantes, que, no obstante el ningún perjuicio y aun la aquiescencia del interesado, el acto prohibido pueda causar un daño a la colectividad, al Estado o a la nación.”).
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999) (“[M]odern class action practice emerged in the 1966 revision of Rule 23.”); Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23, governing federal-court class actions, stems from equity practice and gained its current shape in an innovative 1966 revision.”).
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 771 (2006) (“[D]ue process requires” “the standard of fundamental fairness,”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process Clause promotes fairness.”); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (“The role of the judiciary is limited to determining whether . . . procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[D]ue process of law” encompasses “traditional standards of fairness”).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (Difficulties with the Original Rule).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(B).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(C-E).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3, 1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5, 2).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (Subdivision (d)).
See generally Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893, 938–39 (2012).
Convención Interamericana sobre Exhortos o Cartas Rogatorias, art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S. T.S. No. 43, 1438 U.N.T.S. 287 (“notificaciones”; “emplazamientos”). The official English version speaks of “service of process” and “summonses.” Inter-Am. Conv. Letters Rog., art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975, 1975 U.S.T. LEXIS 589, 1438 U.N.T.S. 287, O.A.S. T.S. No. 43.
Form. B, Anexo, Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Interamericana sobre Exhortos o Cartas Rogatorias, May 8, 1979, O.A.S. T.S. No. 56, 1438 U.N.T.S. 322 (“citación al demandado”). The official English version reads “service on [the addressee] as a defendant.” Form. B, Annex Add. Proto. Inter-Am. Conv. Letters Rog., May 8, 1979, 1975 U.S.T. LEXIS 589, 1438 U.N.T.S. 322; O.A.S. T.S. No. 56.
MIGUEL ÁNGEL NARVÁEZ CARVAJAL, MANUAL SOBRE EXHORTOS Y CARTAS ROGATORIAS 26 (2014) (“La cooperación judicial internacional [permite a] las juezas, jueces y tribunales nacionales . . . citar al demandado [a través de los] órganos judiciales de otros Estados. . . .”).
In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. 76, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(i-vii).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2).
See Ángel R. Oquendo,
CÓDIGO FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES [FEDERAL CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURES] [CD. FED. PRO. CIV.] art. 581(III) (Mex.) (“Acción individual homogénea: Es aquélla de naturaleza divisible, que se ejerce para tutelar derechos e intereses individuales de incidencia colectiva, cuyos titulares son los individuos agrupados con base en circunstancias comunes . . . .”).
L. 472, art. 1 (Colom.) (“La presente ley tiene por objeto regular las acciones populares y las acciones de grupo de que trata el artículo 88 de la Constitución Política de Colombia.”).
L. 45, art. 129 (Pan.) (2007) (“El ejercicio de las acciones de clase, en materia de consumo, corresponde a uno o más miembros de un grupo o clase de personas que han sufrido un daño o perjuicio derivado de un producto o servicio. Tal ejercicio se entiende en beneficio del respectivo grupo o clase de personas.”).
L. 19, art. 1421-I (Pan.) (2008) (“Cuando se lesionen derechos subjetivos individuales, provenientes de origen común y tengan como titulares a los miembros de un grupo, categoría o clase, los afectados, colectivos de afectados o las organizaciones no gubernamentales constituidas para la defensa de derechos colectivos estarán legitimados para promover la acción en defensa de los derechos individuales homogéneos.”).
CÓDIGO DE PROTECCIÓN Y DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR [CODE FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND DEFENSE], L. 29571, art. 105 (Peru) (2010) (“El Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (Indecopi) es la autoridad con competencia primaria y de alcance nacional para conocer las presuntas infracciones a las disposiciones contenidas en el presente Código, así como para imponer las sanciones y medidas correctivas establecidas . . . .”).
Tribunal Constitucional del Perú, Sept. 4, 2009, [Lovón Ruiz-Caro v. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,] Expediente
L. 7347, art. 1 (Braz.) (1985) (“Regem-se pelas disposições desta Lei . . . as ações de responsabilidade por danos morais e patrimoniais causados: (I) ao meio ambiente; (II) ao consumidor; (III) à ordem urbanística; (II) aos bens e direitos de valor artístico, estético, histórico, turístico e paisagístico . . . .”).
CÓDIGO DE DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR [CODE FOR CONSUMER DEFENSE], L. 8078, art. 81(III) (Braz.) (1990) (“A defesa coletiva será exercida quando se tratar de . . . III - interesses ou direitos individuais homogêneos, assim entendidos os decorrentes de origem comum.”).
Iniciativa Ad. Disposiciones Cd. Fed. Pro. Civ. (Acciones y procedimientos colectivos), Dip. Jaime Fernando Cárdenas Gracia (Feb. 9, 2010), art. 554 (“miembro de la colectividad o grupo . . . pedir su exclusión”).
Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich, Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
CONST. art. 43 (Arg.) (1995), CÓDIGO PROCESUAL CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE CODE] arts. 71-86 (Arg.) (2011); CONST. arts. 135, 136, 137 (Bol.) (2009); L. del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional [L. Trib. Const. Plurinacional] [Law of the Plurinational Court] arts. 94-100 (Bol.) (2010), CD. PRO. CONST. art 68-71 (Bol.) (2012); L. JURIS. CONST. art. 33 (C.R.) (2010); CONST. art 67(1) (Dom. Rep.) (2015); Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la República [Organic Law of the Judicial Power] art. 9 (Nicar.) (2021); CONST. art. 134 (Para.) (1992); CÓDIGO GENERAL DEL PROCESO [CD. GEN. PRO.] arts. 42, 220 (Uruguay) (1988). In the region, Cuba stands out as the only country without any such suits. Nonetheless, it has faced proposals for their institutionalization.
CONST. art. 43 (Arg.) (1995); CONST. arts. 132, 136, 137 (Bol.) (2009), CD. PRO. CONST. art. 72-78 (Bol.) (2012), L. Trib. Const. Plurinacional arts. 101-108 (Bol.) (2010); CONST. art. 102(I)(a) (Braz.) (restricted standing); CONST. art. 93 (Chile) (1980); CONST. art. 241(4) (Colom.); L. de la Jurisdicción Constitucional [Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction] arts. 48, 75 (C.R.) (1989); CONST. art. 185 (1) (Dom. Rep.) (2015); CONST. art. 436(2) (Ecuador) (2008); CONST. art. 98 (El Sal.) (1983), L. de Procedimientos Constitucionales [Law of Constitutional Procedure] art. 2 (El Sal.) (2006); CONST. art. 267 (Guat.) (1993), L. de Amparo, Exhibición Personal y de Constitucionalidad [Law of the Protective Writ, Habeas Corpus, and Constitutionality] art. 134(d) (Guat.) (1986); CONST. art 185 (Hond.) (2005), L. Sobre Justicia Constitucional [Law of Constitutional Justice] art. 94 (Hond.) (1994); CONST. art. 105(II) (Mex.) (restricted standing); CONST. art. 187 (Nicar.) (1987); Ley de Amparo y Sus Reformas [Law of Protective Writ and Its Amendments] arts. 2, 6, 18 (Nicar.) (1988); CONST. art. 206(1) (Pan.); CONST. arts. 132, 260 (Para.) (1992), CÓDIGO PROCESUAL CIVIL [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 550 (Para.) (1988); CONST. art. 203(5) (Peru); CONST. art. 26 (Venez.).
CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, 47.23.3 (534) (“Sed si ex eadem causa saepius agatur [agetur], cum idem factum sit, exceptio vulgaris rei iudicatae opponitur.”) “If a particular matter had been disposed of in a popular action, the respondent in a subsequent action based upon the same cause of action could plead res judicata.” Johan D. Van der Vyver, Actiones Populares
CD. CIV. arts. 75, 948, 2328, 2333 (Chile).
CD. FED. PRO. CIV. art. 580(I) (Mex.) (“[L]as acciones colectivas son procedentes para tutelar . . . [d]erechos e intereses difusos y colectivos, entendidos como aquéllos de naturaleza indivisible cuya titularidad corresponde a una colectividad de personas, indeterminada o determinable, relacionadas por circunstancias de hecho o de derecho comunes.”);
CONST. art. 105(II) (Mex.) (“Las acciones de inconstitucionalidad podrán ejercitarse, dentro de los 30 días naturales siguientes a la fecha de publicación de [una] norma [federal o estatal], por: [e]l equivalente al 33% de los integrantes de [los cuerpos legislativos que promulgaron esta o por el] Procurador General de la República.”).
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [Sup. Ct.] [Supreme Court], Pleno [Plenum], Nov. 1, 2000, Recurso de reclamación en la acción de inconstitucionalidad [Procedural Motion on Unconstitutionality Action] 1/95, Reg. No. 6764, at 31, 193, Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, Tomo III, Noviembre [November] de 2000, página 461 (Mex.) (on file with author) (quoting Exposición de motivos de la ley reglamentaria del artículo 105 constitucional [Preamble to Regulatory Law for Constitutional Article 105]) (“[S]e establece la improcedencia respecto de aquellas acciones en las que exista . . . cosa juzgada.”).
CONST. art. 26 (Venez.) (“Toda persona tiene derecho de acceso a los órganos de administración de justicia para hacer valer sus derechos e intereses, incluso los colectivos o difusos . . . .”).
Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Organic Law on the Supreme Court] [L. Orgánica Trib. Sup.], art. 146 (Venez.) (2010) (“Toda persona podrá demandar la protección de sus derechos e intereses colectivos o difusos.”).
Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Trib. Sup.] [Supreme Court], Sala Constitucional [Constitutional Chamber], July 22, 2010, [Asociación Civil Súmate v. Consejo Nacional Electoral,] Sentencia [Judgment] 796, (Venez.) (on file with author) (“[L]a acción de nulidad por inconstitucionalidad es una acción popular que puede ser ejercida por cualquier ciudadano . . . .”).
L. Orgánica Trib. Sup., art. 32 (Venez.) (2010) (“Los efectos de dicha sentencia serán de aplicación general.”).
L. 472, art. 2 (Colom.) (1998) (“Acciones populares. Son los medios procesales para la protección de los derechos e intereses colectivos.”).
CONST. art. 241(4) (Colom.) (“[L]a Corte Constitucional . . . cumplirá las siguientes funciones: . . . “Decidir sobre las demandas de inconstitucionalidad que presenten los ciudadanos contra las leyes”).
Decreto 2067, art. 6 (Colom.) (1991) (“Se rechazarán las demandas que recaigan sobre normas amparadas por una sentencia que hubiere hecho tránsito a cosa juzgada. . . .).
Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Ct. Const.] [Constitutional Court], Oct. 21, 1998, Sentencia C-600/98, at 9 (Colom.) (on file with author) (citation omitted) (“§ VI.3”) (“La Corte Constitucional, en lo que hace a las normas sometidas a su examen, define, con la fuerza de la cosa juzgada constitucional . . . , su exequibilidad o inexequibilidad . . . , con efectos
Ct. Const., Aug. 1, 2012, Sentencia C-608/12, ¶ 2.4.1.3, at 20 (Colom.) (on file with author) (“[P]ara que pueda hablarse de la existencia de cosa juzgada en estricto sentido, es preciso que la nueva controversia verse (i) sobre el mismo contenido normativo del mismo precepto examinado y (ii) sobre cargos idénticos a los analizados en ocasión anterior.”);
L. 24, art. 78 (Pan.) (1995) (“En cumplimiento de la presente Ley, toda persona podrá interponer acción pública ambiental, sin necesidad de asunto previo cuando por su naturaleza no exista una lesión individual o directa, sino que atañe a los intereses difusos o a los intereses de la colectividad.”).
CONST. art. 206(1) (Pan.) (“La Corte Suprema de Justicia . . . en pleno conocerá y decidirá . . . sobre la inconstitucionalidad de las Leyes . . . que por razones de fondo o de forma impugne ante ella cualquier persona.”).
C
CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL [CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL CODE] [CD. PRO. CONST.], L. 28237, art. 40 (Peru) (2004) (“Asimismo, puede interponer demanda de amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de amenaza o violación del derecho al medio ambiente u otros derechos difusos que gocen de reconocimiento constitucional . . . .”). “A protective (
CD. PRO. CONST., L. 28237, art. 55 (Peru) (2004) (“La sentencia que declara fundada la demanda de amparo contendrá alguno o algunos de los pronunciamientos siguientes: Declaración de nulidad . . . ; Restitución . . . ordenando que las cosas vuelvan al estado en que se encontraban . . . ; Orden y definición precisa de la conducta a cumplir . . . .”).
Tribunal Constitucional [Trib. Const.] [Constitutional Court], Sept. 4, 2009, [Lovón Ruiz-Caro v. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,] Expediente No. 05287-2008-PA/TC, ¶ 21 (§ 2.5.1(a)) (Peru) (on file with author) (quoting EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, JUICIO DE AMPARO E INTERÉS LEGíTIMO: LA TUTELA DE LOS DERECHOS DIFUSOS Y COLECTIVOS 16 (2003)) (“La sentencia respectiva surtirá efectos respecto de “
Trib. Const., Oct. 18, 2006, 5270-2005-PA/TC 3, ¶ 13 (Peru) (on file with author) (“[L]a acción colectiva (
CD. PRO. CONST., L. 28237, arts. 75-108 (Peru) (2004) (Tit. VI-VIII).
CONST. art. 203(5) (Peru), (“Están facultados para interponer acción de inconstitucionalidad: Cinco mil ciudadanos con firmas comprobadas por el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones.”).
CD. PRO. CONST. (Peru), L. 28237, art. 77 (2004) (“La demanda de inconstitucionalidad procede contra las normas que tienen rango de ley . . . .”).
CÓDIGO ORGÁNICO DEL AMBIENTE [ORGANIC CODE ON THE ENVIRONMENT], pmbl. (Ecuador) (2017) (El derecho de “la naturaleza [a] restauración será independiente de la obligación que tienen el Estado y las personas naturales o jurídicas de indemnizar a los individuos y colectivos que dependan de los sistemas naturales afectados.”) (“Para garantizar el derecho individual y colectivo a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el Estado se compromete a: 1. Permitir a cualquier persona natural o jurídica, colectividad o grupo humano, ejercer las acciones legales y acudir a los órganos judiciales y administrativos, sin perjuicio de su interés directo, para obtener de ellos la tutela efectiva en materia ambiental, incluyendo la posibilidad de solicitar medidas cautelares que permitan cesar la amenaza o el daño ambiental materia de litigio.”);
Ct. Const., Apr. 14, 2009, Res. 927-2006-RA, Registro Oficial Suplemento 117 (Ecuador) (Así, “tratándose de la vulneración a derecho difusos, . . . está[n] legitimado[s] para proponer una acción de amparo . . . los actores . . . al encontrarse facultados conforme lo manda la . . . vigente Constitución del 2008 . . . en el Art. 397 . . . .”).
L. Orgánica Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Const., art. 95 (Ecuador) (2009) (“Las sentencias que se dicten en el ejercicio del control abstracto de constitucionalidad surten efectos de cosa juzgada y producen efectos generales hacia el futuro.”).
Álvaro Gutiérrez Godoy,
CONST. art. 5(LXXIII) (Braz.) (Qualquer “cidadão é parte legítima para propor ação popular que vise a anular ato lesivo ao patrimônio público ou de entidade de que o Estado participe, à moralidade administrativa, ao meio ambiente e ao patrimônio histórico e cultural.”).
L. 4717, art. 18 (Braz.) (1965) (“A sentença terá eficácia de coisa julgada oponível erga omnes . . . :”).
CONST. art. 102(I)(a) (Braz.) (“Compete ao Supremo Tribunal Federal, precipuamente, a guarda da Constituição, cabendo-lhe: processar e julgar, originariamente: a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade de lei ou ato normativo federal ou estadual . . . :”);
Procurador-Geral da República [Procurator General of the Republic], Aug. 20, 2020, Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade [Direct Action of Unconstitutionality] 6.494-Distrito Federal [ADI 6.494 / DF], at 14-15 (Decorre “da causa pedir aberta em ação direta a inviabilidade, em regra, de rediscussão de lei ou de ato normativo já declarado constitucional pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal . . . :”).