Corporate Governance and Risks in Financialized Economy

A Contribution by Kalecki

Abstract

This paper examines corporate governance, its relationship with the maximization of investor profits, and the evolution of the dynamics of capitalist enterprises in recent decades. The influence of corporate governance on the structure of publicly traded companies was explored, observing how it restricts the power of managers and emphasizes shareholders. Kalecki's theory was used to examine the marginal efficiency of investment, highlighting the importance of interest rates and market risks in optimizing investor gains. The speed of net marginal profitability and its relationship with resource allocation and corporate financial wealth were also discussed. It was observed how financialization influenced corporate governance, transforming it into a system geared toward financial interests. Globalization and the decentralization of decisions in favor of shareholders are considered central features of corporate governance. The conclusion is that corporate governance has become a strategy of capitalist accumulation that concentrates power in finance, turning production into subordination to market and investor demands.