Teoria jurídica da regulação: entre escolha pública e captura

Márcio Iório Aranha

Resumo


A regulação, como administração conjuntural das leis, tem sido objeto de especial atenção no Brasil a partir da década de 1990. Este artigo propõe responder à pergunta de pesquisa sobre a relação entre os fundamentos da teoria econômica da regulação e a teoria jurídico-processual da regulação, tendo por parâmetro metodológico a teoria da escolha pública de Duncan Black, Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Mancur Olson, William Niskanen e George Stigler. A hipótese que se pretende comprovar é a de que tais abordagens econômica e jurídica não se afirmam como antípodas, mas como abordagens apoiadas em objetivos distintos – descritivos ou prescritivos – e preocupadas com momentos distintos do fenômeno regulatório, senão mesmo, em alguns casos, complementares, como decorre da proposta do mercado de serviços burocráticos de Niskanen. O artigo conclui que, embora os pontos de partida dogmáticos da escolha pública e da teoria jurídico-processual da regulação se diferenciem pela aplicação da concepção orgânica de Estado nesta última, ambas partem de um pressuposto comum de influência dos indivíduos no processo de tomada de decisão coletiva, reconciliando-as frente à principiologia de direito público.


Palavras-chave


teoria jurídico-processual da regulação, escolha pública, mercado de serviços burocráticos, teoria econômica da regulação, concepção orgânica de Estado.

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